As with many of the other 45 000 computer viruses operating across the globe, the Melissa virus constitutes a significant threat to organisational processes. There are two major readings of the Melissa virus's social and political implications -one rejecting its subversive intent, the other celebrating it. In either case, these readings reflect the inadequacy of current theorisations of the relationship between computer networked communication, organisational theory and democracy. A fuller understanding of this relationship, and in particular the culture of hacking, is needed to mediate significant tensions within contemporary culture and politics.
oppositional conceptions of organisational communication and contemporary democracy.
The first reading of Melissa invokes a utilitarian conception of social and cultural processes; democracy is regarded as delegatory, regulated, variously hierarchical and embedded in the basic imperatives of contemporary capitalism. The discourses of this approach are grounded in corporatist interests and the language of current managerial and organisational theories. The meaning of Melissa, and the broader cultures of hacking and virus creation, are inscribed within an understanding of criminality, disorderliness, antidemocracy; the virus constitutes a threat to the prevalent ideal of a globally informated utility. Thus, the liberal-democratic ideal conceives of a society which is organised through greater or lesser nodes of 'bit-work' where computer communication facilitates a more comfortable reconciliation of individual and systematised needs and functions (Negroponte, 1996) . The continual time/space concentration of the technological communication of information progressively enhances both the organisation of democracy through increased access to information and participation, and the organisation of capitalism in its eternal drive to compress the processes of value, work and commodification. The new networked communication systems harness and direct these values for the successful mediation of individual merits and privileges within a collective stability. Melissa hacks into this global utility and undermines it.
A second reading questions the ideological underpinnings of a view such as this which upholds a system that necessarily validates certain relationships of power and certain formations of privilege, denying configurations, differences and pleasures which do not conform to its assumed utility. In response to these deficiencies, the second reading inscribes the virus and its wider hacking culture into an engagement with a form of personalised (Poster 1997 , Giddens 1994 
or 'visceral' democracy (Lewis forthcoming b).
A visceral reimagining of democracy overwrites traditional democratic investiture in upward representation, orderly conduct and the strictures of a humanist ideology with an intensified investment in multiplicity and multiculturalism, the integrity of individual difference, and new and liberated identities, sexualities and pleasures. Melissa redeploys the body within and beyond the system for its own trajectories of freedom.
Inevitably, it would seem, the Melissa discourses have resolved themselves into an oppositional, even polemical, relationship. Our aim here is to illuminate these discourses through a framework which identifies the ideologies and language formations which constitute the respective poles; secondly, however, we would also seek to illuminate these ideologies and language formations in terms of the cultural conditions that draw the respective discourses into conflict. In particular, we would wish to locate the polemic within the broader context of contemporary technological culture, articulated through liberal-humanist progressivism on the one hand, and postmodern progressivism on the other. In this sense, liberal-humanism generally seeks its solutions to the multiplicity of individual and collective interests through a fine balancing of delegated power, individualism and organisational formations; postmodernism claims to liberate particulate experiences and pleasures from the inimical effects of systematisation, political distance and the artifice of social order.
Our own framework seeks to advance these articulations through a more complete acknowledgement of the contradictions and multiplicities of language claims (language wars) which constitute contemporary culture. Computer viruses which attack the organisational constituency of contemporary communicative systems are necessarily implicated in these broader political/ideological disputes. This paper doesn't seek to reconcile these disputes, nor do we seek to expose the true identity of the Melissa virus.
Rather, through the deployment of a theory of transculturalism (see Lewis 1994 Lewis , 1997 Lewis , 1998 ) the conceptual parameters of computer networked communication may be extended, most especially through the problematic of contemporary cultural politics and the possibilities of reform, democracy and transgression.
Digit-disorderly
The spread of the Melissa virus has taken place in the context of what Stuart Hall has termed the global postmodern (1991). Various cultural commentators have examined this contemporary configuration, as exemplified for instance in Appadurai's description of five 'scapes', envisaged as the flow and counterflow of peoples, finance, technologies, media and ideologies over the surface of the globe (Appadurai 1990 ; see also Ang & Stratton 1996 , Docker 1995 . The increasing propinquity of cultures in this maelstrom of compressed information raises questions about changes and impacts in relationships of power and pleasure, in flows and nodalisations of ideology, in formations and deconstructions of knowledge. The effects of this transculturalism might be positive, negative, or a combination of both, and may be mobilised in a variety of ways, as marked out on the terrain of language wars (Lewis 1998 , forthcoming a, forthcoming b). Familiar stabilisations in concentrated power and privilege are surely in evidence, as demonstrated for instance by Hall's signalling of the ceaseless ability of capital to transform and morph itself throughout these global scapes. However, we witness also the withering of these concentrations of meaning in the pull of the individual body towards disruption, resistance and non-meaning, and also in the significant tensions within the systematising of organising itself. In effect then, the Melissa virus and the field in which it unfolds probe at our very processes of organisation: of social and cultural relationships, of personal and institutional formations, of information and communication, of mediating technology.
These questions themselves converge on the central problem of the organising of democracy, and on the tensions intrinsic to democratic configurations, particularly the pivotal tension between the individual and the collective (Laclau 1996, Lewis forthcoming).
That we are in the midst of a transforming global arena of some form is undeniable, and the first and most common reading of the Melissa virus, as exemplified in the coverage by the mass media, has not neglected this. However, in this reading, the global postmodern and its implications for the organisation of democracy differ somewhat from those articulated by cultural commentators such as Hall, Appadurai and Lewis. Rather, 'globalisation' is configured as a primarily economic process, organising is understood to be institutional, and representations of the virus assume a transparency unhindered by processes of power/knowledge (Foucault 1981a (Foucault , 1981b . In a reading which parallels to a close degree discussions of the putative 'post-industrial era' as discussed by Bell (1973) and popular management literature (Drucker 1992 , Handy 1990 , Belden, Hyatt & Ackley 1993 , Bridges 1997 , Mariotti 1997 , Pedler, Burboyne & Boydell 1991 , Stewart 1997 ) each of the three widely discussed effects of the contemporary condition is articulated within the currently hegemonic discourses of neo-liberalism/neo-utilitarianism (see Giddens 1994 , Lewis forthcoming b) and mediated humanism. Cultural contiguity is an opportunity for increased competitiveness; velocity of imaging and information bombardment can be channelled appropriately for the increased functioning of organisational processes; time and space compression signal both the need and the opportunity to increase speed, efficiency and drive within the global utility. And not only do these changes converge with market interests, the confluence of globally networked communication technologies and rapid information transmission upholds humanist impulses. The organisation and mediation of information as a central image in the first reading of the Melissa text resonates overtly with traditional ideas of democracy, linked as they are to the healthy functioning of a representative system that relies on an informed citizenry.
A similar apprehension of the contemporary world platform is obvious within the formations of currently popular theories of organising. Classical management theory as espoused by Taylor (1911) and Fayol (1949) , which paralleled organising with the functioning of a machine, is readily criticised for its stagnancy and lack of dynamism in the new world order of instability and change. New versions of systems theory, which rely on a metaphorical link between organisations and living biological systems, argue for an organisation's need to create a symbiosis with its environment by adapting to changes in its surroundings. The tropes of nature and biology occur regularly within the text of Melissa, most obviously in the metaphor of a 'virus', which as Deborah Lupton argues 'has a particular cultural resonance in an epoch obsessed with health, cleanliness and bodily integrity, in which the entry of viruses into the body is viewed as invasion by microscopic alien and contaminating beings intent on causing mayhem ' (1994, 558) .
Organisations have been 'crippled' by the 'fast-breeding' virus (The Australian 31/3), as it spreads like 'plague locusts' (The Age 31/3), 'threatening a widespread infection of computer systems' (Reuters 28/3) to which not even those of high social status, privilege and authority such as 'the governor of North Dakota' are 'immune' (AP 30/3b). Risk to the survival, stability and integrity of the system is the menace, and in a discourse closely paralleling Western medicine the solution becomes the apprehension and inoculation of the infectious disease with an 'antidote' (AP 28/3), risk-insurance in the form of commodified security so that 'future outbreaks will be less severe' (The Australian 13/4).
Software therapy for the computer system, like vitamin therapy for the bodily system, becomes the commodified resolution, rather than a longer-term approach to understanding the larger or more complex issues in power, culture and social privilege.
The biological apprehension of the virus is likewise evident in the description of the virus as being 'in the wild': that part of nature which is yet untamed by human cultivation.
An equally popular understanding of organisational processes draws on developments within cybernetic theory and likewise incorporates in its theorising an awareness that organisations must adapt and improve in an environment of ever-increasing turbulence and instability: 'In this world, where rapid change and transformation are becoming the norm, organisations face new challenges. In addition to planning and executing tasks in an efficient rational way, they face the challenge of constant learning and, perhaps even more important, of learning to learn' (Morgan 1997 
Hyper-systematic
However, cracks in the order of the system appear almost immediately. Scarcity and value, the underpinnings of capitalist exchange processes, undermine the collaborative veneer of the efforts to identify, halt and secure against the Melissa virus. Certain characters enjoy significant benefits in the spread of viruses, not only in the obvious form of anti-virus software companies, who have consistently used Melissa's infamy to propagate their marketing initiatives 2 , but also in that of the 'traditional' authorities whose newly upgraded cybercrime divisions have gained an edge in public image and exposure. Immediate competitive advantages weighed against the majority of losers (300 companies and 100,0000 users said to be affected) calls into question the hopes of collaboration in a competitive system.
But even beyond individual instances of the internal contradictions of capital such as these, and their equivocation of Melissa's status, the principles of scarcity and value attack at the very basis of mediated democracy: the partnering of freely flowing information and a healthy democracy. As argued by Mark Poster, we are witnessing the legitimisation of the 'extension of the commodity form to the new realm of information, reversing a longstanding liberal principle that, in a democracy, knowledge and information in general must be freely accessible' (Poster 1990, 27) . Melissa evidences this suturing of information to scarcity and value within our growing networked world:
everything in this narrative is commodified-security, safety, privacy, information. In how different is that from contemporary systems of work and production, where profit is often the ultimate and only driver, effacing even the shadow of use-value, utility, real worth, true cost, in a market where desire is engendered in and for the insubstantiality of images in an endlessly rapid movement towards dissolution? As Bogard argues, this is the simulation of work, the simulation of utility, the simulation of production itself:
'Simulated work, cyborg "production", is designed to resemble a past when work still meant something, when there were still some real reasons left in working, an end or finality-political, social, economic-that would make sense of it ' (1996, 120) .
Following Baudrillard, Bogard describes contemporary work as 'the pure process of signalisation, a definite apotheosis of production, its elevation to the realm of pure simulacrum ' (1996, 109) . Melissa is the not the threat to the system, it is the future of the system.
Bogard goes on to argue that the computerisation and networking of work not only engenders its perpetual simulation, but it also creates a context of hyper-surveillance, a facilitation for the most minute and intensified disciplinary control. According to his argument, and that of other writers concerned with the increasingly surveyed nature of our societies (e.g. Lyon 1994 , Rochlin 1997 , Taylorised, machinic, precisely controlled workplaces have not been overwritten with the new, thinking, learning, creative organisation of living or cybernetic systems. Rather, this is the era of the 'transparent worker' and the 'watched workplace' (Lyon 1994, 118-135) : 'These methods are not discarded, but reconfigured and totalised by new information technologies and bio-logics' (Bogard 1996, 99) . The internalising of surveillance and the proliferation of invisibly pervasive digital tracking practices, coupled together, simulate the ultimate in worker freedom, offering unprecedented choice in self-organisation, when in fact 'Today, we are crossing the threshold of informated labour, which is also hyperdisciplined labour, and the cyborg is its new "body",' (Bogard 1996, 99) . And technological surveillance is not merely initiated within the workplace, but is becoming an increasingly important aspect of social organisation. Techniques of virtual tracking, email spying, time-logging, routine monitoring, electronic verification and the ongoing creation and manipulation of 'digital individuals' (Kilger 1994) are mimicked by the daily operations of commercial enterprises in their marketing, forecasting and polling research. Thus, even when the concern rests firmly within liberalist discourse, at the level of individual 'rights' to freedom in the face of state (or large corporate) abuses of power, rather than the broader social impacts investigated by commentators such as Bogard, Lyon and others, the tension between the individual and the collective produces a significant destabilising force within the concept of social order, its functioning, and the current organisation of democracy.
Identity hacking
No-one can legitimately romanticise hackers and virus writers. In an era when we rely on computers and networks, these individuals are a menace. They are nothing more than criminals.
-Graeme Philipson, (1999, April 20) . 'Viromaniacs to strike again'. The Age.
The neo-utilitarian or liberalist leanings within this first reading of the Melissa virus, even when mollified somewhat by humanist concerns, is typical of the current political scene. This conception of the individual body 'making do' with the system's resources is further applied by some theorists to the appropriation of cultural texts. These advocates of cultural subversion include reception theorists (Ang 1990 , Fiske 1987 , 1989 , Jenkins 1992 , Radway 1987 ) who inscribe political meaning into the everyday uses made of texts which they argue demonstrate the mutation, the massaging of popular culture into experiences of liberation and personal pleasure. The creator of the Melissa virus used the materials of computer code, corporate software and the 'macro' toys of the bourgeois PC user to free himself into difference. He rewrote the text, used it for his own ends and bodily pleasure, subverted the digital pathways and friendly helpmates of the social order.
He even fashioned his own identity on the quintessential 'bad boy' of popular culture: 
Particulated politics
The investment in pure bodily freedom through difference and system-subversion is problematic, and never quite manages to overcome those fixities of meaning which previously collapsed a theoretics centred on system utility and humanism, as we saw with the first reading of Melissa. In this case, the gap between signifier and signified is re-filled through the postmodern theoretical interpretation of freedom, and meaning is reinvested in the activities under analysis. Difference from the social order and the montage of particularity become new stabilities from which to advance a politics, belying instabilities of meaning, order and language. Within the text of the Melissa virus, mutable processes of power and signification are evidenced in a number of movements which converge around the uncertainty of this new digital identity.
The seemingly disjunctive combination of interests pursued digitally by David Smiths serves to illuminate the precarious nature of identity implicit within the conceptual space of hacking and its status as creative or disorderly. Art, music, sex, computer viruses are in fact surprisingly uniform in their articulation of impulses towards the pleasures of release into creativity and bodily gratification. Essentially human in nature, each of these impulses quavers at the border of transgression, where a tiny push could collapse the divide into threat and subversion. Art and music, both highly valued within the humanist tradition, also enjoy a lineage of political inscription aimed at destabilising or rejecting the system of their consumption. Sex, which features prominently in Melissa's narrative, is equally ambiguous; its existence is necessary for the continuation as well as toleration of the human condition, but as Foucault has clearly illustrated, it must be culturally managed in a variety of ways. Topless dancers, one of whom purportedly gave her name to Melissa, and sex discussion groups, from which the virus found its release to the world, are both mildly transgressive while still being nominally accepted if not condoned in our society.
Computer viruses parallel this uncertainty. Are viruses a legitimate form of expression, an artistic pursuit, or an illegitimate and threatening application of knowledge? Ponderings of where to instil the ultimate 'blame' for the Melissa virus illuminate this ambiguity. Within the media, most commentators pushed for Melissa's author to be blamed, and in particular, since evidence suggested that the virus was the work of two individuals, the programmer with the most talent, whose actions were to use genius and elite knowledge for the detriment of human order. A prominent viral community, the Virus Exchange Underground, in a bid to secure the meaning in a different way, released its own press statement which argued that it was not the author, but the discharger of the virus who should be to blame. This defence is based on assumptions of the validity of creative genius, artistry, the pursuit of knowledge and freedom of speech. Debates over the Melissa virus thus converge around the long-standing tension between knowledge for its own sake and the deployment of that knowledge. The precarious line between creativity and transgression, mild amusement and dangerous destruction, knowledge and its deployment, is the ongoing focus within these language wars.
The unstable organisation of the meaning around these digital activities is further illustrated by the current process by which hackers' expert knowledge of computer systems and their subversion is being harnessed for processes of law, order and regulation.
Corporations in the business of supplying digital security for a fee are said to be 'busily trawling for good hackers':
There's a thin line of bits and bytes between the good and the bad hackers Finally, the precarious processes of identifying with and fitting into the social order finds its exemplification in David Smith's intention to return to work. Reportedly, Smith contacted his supervisor at AT& T on Friday morning, the day after his arrest. 'He phoned his boss today to say he wouldn't be in, but added that he'd see him next week,' said AT& T spokesperson Burke Stinson, whose own response was: 'Fat chance. My guess is we won't be seeing much of him in the future.' Thus, even as alleged creator of a virus which had disrupted corporate systems worldwide, sending off illicitly transgressive content in an annoyingly pervasive and rapid fashion, as the object of a combined federal government and corporate man-hunt, David Smith still includes himself within the imaginings of 'system', and acts within the ordering of its rhythm; he calls his boss and excuses himself from work for the day, hoping to return again the following week.
Alternative imaginings
I've talked to people who, literally, were crying on the telephone-a woman whose poetry book was almost done and completely lost, a man whose doctoral dissertation was lost. They were devastated. Jean François Lyotard (1991) has condemned the formation of the world through systematised 'bits of information', arguing for the re-invigoration of an 'inhuman' and abstract imagination (see also Lyotard, 1993: Ch. 13 ). Guattari (1983, 1986) have sought an elision of essentialised self-legitimating systems of dominant order through the substitution of 'assemblages'-temporary formations which permit meaning and pleasure without recourse to rationalised systems of order. Ernesto Laclau (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 1996) has sought to reconcile the problematics of individual and collective interests through a re-ordering of 'collectivity' as an ungrounded and dependent constituitivity of 'agonism'. When collectivity is shifted out of the zone of privileged system, it becomes available for new modes of political action and emancipation. Identity is precisely that collective imagining which may be mobilised freely and openly against the oppression of externally imposed order, values and obedience.
Computer viruses and computer hacking are not in and of themselves essentially good or bad, but may be mobilised against the external imposition of normative order. The concept of system dissolves as the possibilities of a threateningly chaotic, inhuman imagination is released, and the Internet becomes a revelry of expressive possibilities.
Even so, these expressive possibilities are not, as we have indicated, a utopia of creative exigency, but are necessarily implicated in the possibilities of harm. There can be no liberation without the threat of destruction and an inhuman imagining. Thus, the radical potential of networked communication cannot be separated from visceral pleasure and displeasure. Fully acknowledged, however, the multiplicity of claims bridges the space that disconnects individuals from one another, as it presents the opportunity for a radical challenge to the dominating discourses of nodalised media, corporatism, and State and global regulators. The world, that is, will not be divided into margins and centres in perpetuity, but will facilitate the multiplication of claims, the tearing down of monolithic discursive intensities. But these challenges cannot be afforded without the recognition of their perils.
A transcultural theory of democracy and of the digital spaces in which politics will be increasingly played out can neither celebrate nor condemn virus release and hacking. It is not a division between hackers (harmless invaders of secured digital space) and 'crackers'
(conquerors or destroyers of that space). Rather, it is a matter of a radical energy that and sexually inspired dreaming, against the rationalised powers of corporatist and State discourses. There is no outside-inside system, no virtual and experiential divide. Rather, the world shifts uneasily in pursuit of its dreams. David Smith will not be returning to work for a while, but Microsoft continues its surge toward a globally dominant, homogenised discourse -the perfect and universal language about which Descartes dreamed. Our radical rejection and re-creation will necessarily find many modes of expressions.
